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The proper balance between federal initiative and 
state control in policy administration has always been a 
volatile issue in American politics. The Reagan admin-
istration is actively pursuing a program that it hopes will 
reduce the size and scope of the national government, 
decentralize program and policy administration, and 
revitalize state government. I An initial step toward 
decentralization came with the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA81), which consolidated 
more than 50 categorical grants into nine block grants. 
Under the block grant approach, most of these grant 
programs will now be under administrative control of 
state governments rather than federal agencies. 
While the administrative direction of the Reagan 
approach is clear, the policy implications have yet to be 
systematically analyzed. This paper is an analysis of 
changes in one particular block grant altered by 
OBRA81, the small cities portion of the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Following 
Morgan and England's recent article in PAR,2 we are 
primarily concerned with the question of redistribution. 
Particular attention is focused on the proposition that 
decentralization weakens the redistributive character of 
policy allocation. The specific empirical question 
addressed is: have shifts in funding priorities developed 
with the change from Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) to state administration of 
the small cities program? We also analyze the use of 
single purpose and multipurpose grants by both HUD 
and the states. Finally, changes are assessed within the 
context of CDBG as a developing state program. The 
data consist of cross-sectional samples of states admin-
istering the program for one or two years. 
CDBG: Creation and Development 
Several recent studies have analyzed the small cities 
CDBG program under state assumption. 3 While instruc-
tive, these studies have generally suffered from two 
common shortcomings. First, they are almost exclusive-
ly studies of a single state or small group of states. 
Second, the analysis often fails to consider the broader 
context of the CDBG program. Specifically, federal 
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• Recent studies of state assumption of the CDBG-
Small Cities program have been limited by two factors. 
First, they have been single-state case studies or con-
fined to a small number of states. Second, they have 
adopted a narrow context for examining the likely 
impacts of community development following state 
assumption. This paper attempts to expand policy infor-
mation based upon earlier work by studying a larger 
cross-section of states and considering the issues of 
redistribution and decentralization from a broader con-
text. We find some significant policy changes from 
previous HUD program management but suggest that 
such may be due to the CDBG economic development 
amendment and an increase in mUltipurpose projects in 
the states. Unlike Morgan and England's (1984) recent 
article in PAR, we suggest that decentralization may not 
necessarily lead to decreasing redistributive community 
development policies in the states. Rather, redistribu-
tion may be incorporated within the enlarging propor-
tion of mUltipurpose projects. 
funding priorities are often compared to state priorities 
without considering legal and structural changes in the 
CDBG program. Our cross-sectional data, including a 
majority of states administering the CDBG program, 
allows us to address the first flaw. A short discussion of 
the CDBG program, particularly changes wrought by 
amendments in 1978 and 1981, addresses the second. 
When the CDBG program was created in 1974, the 
overarching goal of the new block grant was "the devel-
opment of viable urban communities, ... principally 
for persons of low and moderate income."4 Initially, 
there were seven specific objectives to which local com-
munities could apply funds: elimination of slums and 
blight, elimination of detrimental conditions, conserva-
tion and expansion of housing stock, more rational land 
utilization, improvement of community services, reduc-
tion of income group isolation, and historic preserva-
tion.s From the outset, the primary uses of CDBG funds 
were for neighborhood development, housing rehabili-
tation for low and moderate income families, and infra-
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structure improvements. Secondary uses of funds 
favored water and sewer proj~ts, street and drainage 
improvements, and assistance to community organiza-
tions that aid low and moderate income residents. 6 
However, two amendments have significantly broad-
ened the scope of activities "eligible for funding" 
through CDBG and its small cities program. In 1978, 
the Carter administration allowed communities to grant 
funds to public or private nonprofit entities for the 
alleviation of physical and economic distress. 7 This was 
followed by a Reagan administration initiated amend-
ment that allowed for even more aggressive economic 
development programs through the "provision of assis-
tance to private, for-profit entities. "8 
Both the Carter and Reagan amendments shifted 
CDBG away from a strictly housing and services orien-
tation. The bias in the program is still toward housing 
and public works, but the changes in CDBG permitting 
economic development projects should be incorporated 
into any analysis of states' small cities CDBG funding. 
Empirically, funding in traditional CDBG project 
categories will necessarily decrease as economic devel-
opment projects come "up to speed" from their initiat-
ing amendments of 1978 and 1981. However, past 
analyses have often failed to consider the impact these 
changes may have on CDBG spending priorities. 
An analysis of CDBG's development also suggests 
that targeting of benefits for low-income groups has 
varied somewhat through three administrations. The 
Carter administration emphasized a more direct redis-
tributive effort in the allocation process, an emphasis 
not as apparent under either Ford or Reagan. The 
uncertain standard of redistributive benefit is apparent 
in the CDBG legislation, which stresses selection of 
projects that benefit low-income groups while establish-
ing no specific target figures. This further complicates 
any subsequent analysis of state redistributive efforts, 
as we highlight below. 
CDBG Under State Administration 
Following OBRA81, states could assume complete 
administrative responsibility from HUD for the small 
cities program. In assuming control of the program a 
state must agree to two basic conditions: (1) a continua-
tion of previously approved multi-year projects, and (2) 
adherence to the national objectives of the CDBG Act. 
In the first year of state assumption, 36 states admin-
istered their own Small Cities programs. Since then the 
number of states opting for control has risen to 47. 
Initial analysis of the effects of state assumption have 
produced varied results. The GAO studied seven states 
in 1982-83 to see what changes might result from state 
approved projects. In six of the states, approved 
projects would result in a reduction in direct benefits 
to low and moderate income groups compared to HUD 
administration. The primary shift observed with state 
assumption was a marked decline in housing funds and 
a concomitant increase in public works and economic 
development monies. Although these were planned 
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allocations of CDBG funds, the report cautioned that a 
shift from housing related activities to public facilities 
or economic development may not indicate a decline in 
targeting to needier groups. Rather, the areal benefits of 
improved public facilities and economic development 
activities may also benefit needier groupS.9 A recent 
ACIR report echoes these findings. The commission 
found more monies going to economic development 
under state administration with a proportional decline 
in housing rehabilitation activities. In addition, unlike 
HUD, these states appear to spread the monies across 
more communities. lo 
The recent annual CDBG report by HUD adds fur-
theJ; confirmation to the earlier reports. Reviewing the 
project activities funded by the states in 1982 and 1983 
reveals that public works showed gains in both the 
number of grants and funding levels and a similar pat-
tern was evolving in the economic development area 
(but its funding proportion actually dropped in 1983). 
The number of housing grants has declined from HUD 
days, too, with proportional funding shares at less than 
half of the former HUD-administered level. I I Similarly, 
in a case study of Oklahoma following state assump-
tion, Morgan and England found that state officials 
awarded monies to local areas primarily for public 
works. The state also allocated CDBG monies to a 
larger number of cities on a somewhat less competitive 
basis than employed by HUD.12 
These studies point to programmatic changes in the 
small cities program during state assumption. Of 
primary interest is whether these changes have led to a 
restructuring of national objectives. In particular, has 
there been a shift from the national redistributive goals 
of small cities CDBG to state determined ones? Have 
similar types of projects been funded under state admin-
istration? Are more cities being funded by the state? Is 
targeting to needier areas an active process in the states? 
Analysis of these questions allows broader questions of 
change in American federalism to be addressed. Spe-
cifically, if the nature of state changes in this program 
are not consonant with federal goals, then the move-
ment toward increased decentralization of federal pro-
grams may be undesirable. This would also support the 
proposition that decentralization impedes efforts of 
resource redistribution. Conversely, state administrative 
changes that effectively incorporate congressionally 
determined national interests would cast doubt on the 
proposition and add impetus to an expanded state role 
in policy administration. We now turn to an examina-
tion of these questions embodied in the shift from HUD 
to state administration in the small cities CDBG 
program. 
Data 
The data for this study are drawn from annual reports 
which each state is obligated to file concerning projected 
and actual use of CDBG funds and were obtained from 
the Council of State Community Affairs Agencies 
(COSCAA). Two samples of states have been con-
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structed from the state data.., The first group includes 26 
states' small cities awards during each state's first 
administrative year (either 1982 or 1983). The second 
sample contains 12 states that have two years' (both 
1982 and 1983) experience as program managers. The 
two samples allow us to assess the states' initial year 
with the program and to search for differences when 
compared to the two year composite for states with a 
slightly longer history with the program. An additional 
sample is based upon the 51 states (including Puerto 
Rico) receiving funds under the program in 1981. For 
each state, the actual small cities CDBG expenditures 
were collected for public works (includes public facili-
ties and services), housing, economic development, and 
multipurpose projects. These funding totals do not 
include any "hold-harmless" projects continued from 
HUD multi-year commitments. 
Analysis 
A first test in assessing change in small cities CDBG is 
to determine whether spending priorities have shifted 
with state assumption. As Table 1 indicates, some sig-
nificant changes have occurred in the types of projects 
funded by the states. In 1981 under HUD, housing 
received one-third of CDBG dollars. The experience 
with state assumption shows that housing activities were 
cut in half. Conversely, economic development projects 
have enjoyed major gains. Any shift in funding toward 
economic development must be analyzed within the 
broader context of the CDBG program. As noted 
above, economic development activities were first eligi-
ble for funding in 1978 and then expanded by the 
Reagan administration in 1981. Thus, a shift in propor-
tional allocations should be expected as this new project 
category comes on board. But how much of a funding 
shift is reasonable? While no single figure or expendi-
ture total is absolute, HUD planners projected that 16 
percent of available funds would be targeted to 
economic development projects by 1982. IJ Thus, the 
state increase is slightly higher than expected for the 
sample states' first year and slightly lower over two 
years. 
Public works and multipurpose grants show little 
change from 1981 during the states' first year. But states 
with two years' experience have actually decreased (on 
average) the proportion of funding to public works and 
given multipurpose projects the largest share of the 
CDBG pie. These findings are not consistent with the 
trends that were reviewed above from the research by 
the GAO and HUD. Since the declining share of CDBG 
funds for public works is also not similar to Morgan and 
England's findings in Oklahoma, while the housing and 
economic development trends are relatively consistent 
with their work, we need to address the issue further. 
Based upon these aggregate figures a circumstantial 
case might be forwarded, suggesting that states are 
displacing the redistributive aspects of the small cities 
program. This would be consistent with the seven-state 
GAO analysis performed in 1982. In essence, states may 
be seen as eschewing the direct link of benefits that 
accrue to low and moderate income groups through 
improved housing for more areal benefits contained in 
economic development projects. Moreover, economic 
and employment benefits for lower income individuals 
are often negligible in such projects since these benefits 
more closely represent collective goods. 14 
While this is a valid concern and would demonstrate a 
frustration of national objectives, such a conclusion on 
state intent is premature. While funding for single pur-
pose housing rehabilitation projects has declined, the 
overall dollars for this activity may be relatively con-
stant. This would be true if housing rehabilitation 
projects are a major component of state multipurpose 
project awards. Table 2 shows an analysis of the state 
multipurpose grants and indicates that the largest por-
tion of funds distributed by states during their first year 
TABLE 1 
Project Activity 
Housing 
Public Works/Facilities 
Economic Development 
MUltipurpose and Others 
Total 
(N) 
Distribution of Small Cities CDBG Funds by Project Activity 
During HUD and State Administration 
Percent of Grant Expenditures by: 
HUD (l98})a States (l year)b 
33070 17070" 
38 37 
4 18" 
25 28 
100070 100070 
(51) '(26) 
States (2 years)C 
16070 
29 
14 
41 
100()70 
(12) 
aSource: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Consolidated Annual Report to Congress on Community Development Pro-
grams (Washington, D.C., 1984), Table 2-6, p. 59 (includes Puerto Rico). 
bThese data are derived from individual state reports filed with COSCAA and include the first year of state administration, either 1982 or 1983. 
cThese data include two years' experience with state administration by 12 states, both 1982 and 1983. 
"Difference from 1981 HUD proportion, measured as a pooled difference of proportion Z score, is statistically significant at the .05 le\el. 
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TABLE 2 
Project A'ctivities Included in State Administered Multipurpose Grants 
Project Acthil) 
Housing/Public Work> 
Homing/Economic Development 
Housing/Public WorkvEconomic Development 
Housing and Related Activ ities 
Public Worb/Economic Development 
Public Works and Facilities 
U nspeci fied 
Total 
(N) 
Percent of Multipurpose Expenditures 
Year I a Years I and Zh 
39070 22 010 
10 11 
6 8 
3 5 
1 6 
0 
41 47 
100070 1 ()()07o 
(26) (12) 
aThese data are derived from individual '>tate repons filed with COSCAA and include the first year of state administration, either 1982 or 1983. 
hThese data include two years' experience \\ith state administration by 12 states, both 1982 and 1983. 
incorporated a housing component. While sightly less 
than 50 percent of multipurpose grants over two years in 
the second sample incorporated housing, it is clearly a 
predominant component of the multiple activities. 
(Both sets of housing figures in Table 2 are undoubtedly 
larger because several states did not provide a descrip-
tion of each project and had to be placed in the 
"unspecified" category.) Thus, the observed decline in 
housing dollars may be more a function of changes in 
grant administration than policy redirection, particular-
ly in states approving more multipurpose grants for 
their communities. 
More significant change may be occurring in admin-
istrative procedures rather than policy direction. As the 
figures in Table 1 demonstrate, states are increasing the 
use of multipurpose grants. This finding is certainly at 
odds with some previous single state studies in which 
formal multipurpose programs were terminated. Pos-
sibly, this difference reflects the use of multi-activity 
projects that we observed in the data, as in states like 
California that no longer have a separate program 
called multipurpose projects. Il Our sample states also 
appear to be awarding more grants than under HUD 
administration. While state-by-state grant awards under 
HUD are unavailable for our sample states, an indica-
tion of this change might be the average small cities 
CDBG grants awarded by the states. In 1981, grants 
awarded by HUD averaged $493,000.lb The average 
state administered awards are substantially smaller: 
$280,619 for the sample states in their first year, and 
$337,356 for 12 states over two years. As the total fund-
ing level of the CDBG program has either remained con-
stant or in many states has been expanded with state 
funds, this appears to indicate that the states are award-
ing grants to a larger number of cities, although for 
smaller dollar amounts. One implication of this trend 
may be that CDBG benefits are now available to more 
low and moderate income groups in more communities 
across a state than was the case under HUD. 
Discussion 
Previous research has posited that redistributive pro-
grams may be significantly and unfavorably altered as 
the decision-making arena is narrowed, with national 
interests being supplanted by more parochial concerns.! 7 
If states substitute their own priorities for national 
goals, a consistent bias discriminating against intended 
beneficiaries may develop. This would further 
strengthen existing interests and inequalities, a situation 
which on its face would be undesirable. 
Recently, Morgan and England have added empirical 
support to the belief that states lack the political will 
necessary to pursue redistributive policies. Analyzing 
the small cities CDBG program in Oklahoma, they con-
clude: "In small cities, especially in the Sunbelt, it seems 
likely that maximum local autonomy under a state-
controlled CDBG program may not result in assistance 
to those most in need." 18 
The results of our cross-sectional analysis of states 
participating in the small cities program is at odds with 
the theoretical argument concerning the effects of policy 
decentralization and the findings of Morgan and 
England. Policy shifts that have occurred may be largely 
explained by two factors unrelated to decentralization 
and not examined in the Morgan and England research. 
First, programmatic changes in CDBG approved by 
Congress prior to state assumption have invited changes 
in funding allocations. This specifically concerns the 
decreasing share of funds for housing and other pro-
grams that followed the inclusion of economic develop-
ment as an eligible project activity. Given th~ oppor-
tunity to conduct an economic development project, 
many communities opted to do so; hence, the overall 
averages would have to reflect an increase here with a 
decline in most other preexisting funding categories. 
In addition to this programmatic shift, the type of 
grant utilized by states further mediates the obsen ~J 
JAi\l;AkY I-El3kL\kY 19~h 
.\ REASSESS\IENT OF THE S\IALL CITIES CDBCi PRO(JRA\1 
.., TABLE 3 
Simple Correlation Coefficients Between State Use of Multipurpose Grants 
and State Approved Housing Expenditures for Small Cities 
Proportion of Community 
Development Grants for 
Multipurpose Projects in: 
Year 1 (n = 26) 
Years 1 and 2 (n = 12) 
*p = .06. 
**r = .03. 
shift in emphasis away from redistributive housing and 
related activities. Here the focus is on the use of multi-
purpose grants. The sample states show more reliance 
on this type of grant than was true about all states in 
1981. The mediating effect results from the fact that 
about half of these states' multipurpose grants incor-
porated a housing activity. If housing is still a major 
emphasis in states but is being masked by its incorpora-
tion into multipurpose projects, then states may not be 
shifting away from redistribution. Table 3 presents a 
test of this interpretation. The table first shows the cor-
relation between the proportion of mUltipurpose grants 
awarded by each state and the total dollars allocated to 
housing through single purpose grants. We expect a 
negative relationship since as multipurpose grants 
increase we assume a related decrease in single purpose 
housing awards. As expected, there is a small, negative 
correlation for both of our samples (though statistically 
insignificant). While larger proportions of multipurpose 
awards are related to less money for housing in our 
samples, this does not mean that they have necessarily 
shifted money away from housing activities. As we note 
above, the majority of multipurpose grants incorporate 
housing activities. We then correlated the proportion of 
multipurpose grants awarded by each state with their 
total dollars allocated to housing through both single 
purpose and multipurpose grants. In both cases, this 
correlation is positive, moderately strong, and close to 
acceptable levels of significance. Stated substantively, 
states with a higher proportion of multipurpose grants 
also have higher dollar allocations to housing activities 
as a whole. The difference between HUD and state 
administration, therefore, may not be one of policy 
redirection but rather of allocational distinctions across 
states. This further highlights a difference between our 
results and those of Morgan and England. Our sample 
states generally show increasing use of multipurpose 
Total Expenditures on: 
Single Purpose 
Housing Projects 
-.18 
-.22 
All 
Housing Projects 
.37* 
.43** 
grants while Oklahoma eliminated this type of award in 
its program. 
Conclusion 
The small cities CDBG program is one of the earliest 
articulations of the broader Reagan policy of decentral-
izing policy planning and administration to state gov-
ernments. As such, this state-centered federalism pro-
gram provides a key test as to the potential conse-
quences of state assumption of what were previously 
federal responsibilities. Based on our analysis, concern 
that the redistributive focus of formerly federal pro-
grams will diminish with state assumption may be over-
stated. By considering an expanded sample of states and 
the broader context of the small cities program, we find 
that policy goals have remained relatively constant in 
this initial translation of federal policy by the states. 
Changes have occurred, but for the most part these con-
cern different administrative procedures pursued by the 
states rather than evidence of policy redirection. Indeed, 
the case can be made that these different administrative 
procedures are leading to greater involvement by local 
communities. There may also be greater dispersion of 
resources as more grants are awarded to a larger number 
of communities under state programs. Additionally, the 
increased use of mUltipurpose grants may be evidence of 
a more integrated problem-solving orientation in com-
munity development policies formulated by the states. 
This is not to suggest that inequities have not developed 
in particular states and communities. Considerable 
variation may exist state-to-state or, more likely, 
community-to-community. However, the data in this 
case do not support the conclusion that decentralization 
will necessarily lead to decreasing levels of redistributive 
benefits. 
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